University of Mississippi

eGrove
Honors Theses

Honors College (Sally McDonnell Barksdale
Honors College)

2008

Going Places: The Shift of the Textile Industry to China
Vaughan Abbay Leatherman

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/hon_thesis

Recommended Citation
Leatherman, Vaughan Abbay, "Going Places: The Shift of the Textile Industry to China" (2008). Honors
Theses. 2367.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/hon_thesis/2367

This Undergraduate Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors College (Sally McDonnell
Barksdale Honors College) at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized
administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

GOING PLACES: THE SHIFT OF THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY TO CHINA

By
Vaughan Abbay Leatherman

A thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for completion
of the Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies
Croft Institute for International Studies
(Sally-McDonnell Barksdale Honors College)
University of Mississippi

University, Mississippi
Spring 2008

Approved:

Advisor: Dr. Guo

Reader: Dr. O’Nei

Reader: Dr. Gungoraydinoglu

Contents
List ot* Abbreviations
Introduction
Chapter 1: Reforms to the Chinese Economy, 1978-Present
Chapter 2: History of the Global Textile Industry
Chapter 3: China's Role in the Global Textile Trade
Section 3.1: China’s Textile Production and Trade 1949-1978
Section 3.2: The Success of China's Textile Industry in the Reform Era
Chapter 4: U.S.-Chinese Trade Relations in the Textile Industry
Section 4.1: Relations Prior to the ATC Expiration. 1978-2004
Section 4.2: Exchange Rates Controversy. 2005-Present
Conclusion:
Bibliography:

List of Figures
1.1 Average Annual GDP Growth in the U.S. and China
1.2 Capital Formation in China
3.1 Chinese Textile Exports 1980-2001
3.2 China’s Competitors in Textile Exports
4.1 Percentage of U.S. Textile and Fabric Imports from China

2

3
4
8
16
24
24
26
37
38
43
50
52

List of Abbreviations
GATT
LDC
AAMA
ATMI
AMTAC
WTO
GDP
CCP
PRC
VER
NIC
STA
LTA
MFA
ATC
MTI
FTC
Chinatex
SEZ
MOFERT
ITC
AKA
AAMA
AASA

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Less Developed Countr>'
American Apparel Manufacturers Association
American Textile Manufacturers Institute
American Manufacturing Trade Action Coalition
World Trade Organization
Gross Domestic Product
China Communist Party
Peoples Republic of China
Voluntary Export Restraint
Newly Industrializing Country
Short-Term Arrangement
Long-Term Arrangement
Multifibre Arrangement
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
Ministry of Textile Industry (China)
Foreign Trade Corporation
China National Textiles Import and Export Corporation
Special Economic Zone
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade
International Trade Commission (U.S.)
American Knitwear Association
American Apparel Manufacturers Association
American Sweater Association

3

Introduction

Ever since the end of World W'ar II and the subsequent opening of global trade
through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade(GATT),the global textile industry
has been a subject of great controversy. Until that time, the U.S. was the world’s chief
textile exporter, and because of colonization, textile industries in other developed
countries faced little competition. When colonialism ended and trade liberalization
moved to the top of the global agenda, however, textile mills sprung up across the
developing world. By the mid-1950s, mills in East Asia were globally competitive, and
less-developed countries(LDC's) began flooding industrialized nations with cheap textile
and apparel products.
The cheap imports have proven hard to resist, and they have forced a growing
number of textile mills out of production in the U.S. and Europe. Because ot rampant job
loss in a once-thriving sector of advanced economies, the global textile industry has
arguably been met with a greater level of protectionism than any other industry in history.
Interest groups in the U.S. began to step up their lobbying tactics for textile import
restrictions shortly after the end of World War II. Together, these coalitions such as the
American Apparel Manufacturers Association(AAMA),the American Textile
Manufacturers Institute(ATMI), and the American Manufacturing Trade Action
Coalition(AMTAC)have succeeded in passing a multitude of trade agreements aimed at
reducing textile and clothing imports from LDC’s. Yet, as domestic protesters are well
aware, the face of the global textile trade has been constantly changing from the 1950’s
onward. Production in the sector has continually moved across national borders in search
of greater profit margins and increased access to the global market. Product and fiber
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categories have evolved as well in response to strict quota allocations by members of
GATl and its successor, the World Trade Organization(WTO). At the same time,
growing economies such as China and India have been more outspoken in their demands
for more-equal global trade laws concerning textiles.
These developments in the global textile industry have forced these coalitions to
modify their strategy numerous times over the last half-century, but they refuse to give up
their fight. In response to lobby ists’ relentless cries, policy makers throughout the years
have reacted with what seemed to be the most logical solution—increased protectionism.
For the most part, however, global forces have been more powerful than domestic trade
policy, and import restrictions from the industrialized West have realized little overall
success in preventing the center of global textile production from shifting eastward or in
keeping cheap textiles imports out of developed countries.
In recent years, China has managed to combat Western protectionism and has
surged to the top of the world’s textile production industry. Its path to its position as the
world's largest textile and clothing exporter has not been easy; when the country emerged
on the global trade scene in the late 1970s its textile industry was largely inefficient and
its products were considered inferior. Only through the devoted efforts of government
officials in the 1980s and the will of private entrepreneurs in the 1990s did China achieve
such a high level of success.
This paper will discuss the history of China’s ascent to the top, the baniers
imposed by the West in attempt to impede its success, and the factors that led to China’s
ability to overtake its competitors to become the dominant player in the industry.

5

Chapter 1 provides a background of China’s changing political and economic
structure as it pertains to the country’s recent economic growth. China s reforms to its
economy provided the framework that allowed its textile industry to grow into the
powerhouse that it is today; therefore, a look at China’s economic situation as a whole
will help put the developments specific to its textile manufacturing sector into broader
perspective.
Chapter 2 is a history of the global textile industry. International trade in textiles
has been an important part of the global economy for centuries, and it is important to note
that China has only recently come to dominate the industry. Chapter 2 briefly traces the
shift of mass textile production and export from Great Britain to the United States to the
rest of the world. It focuses primarily on developments in the industry post-World War 11
and explains how international organizations influenced the flow of trade in textiles. It
also outlines the global agreements that restricted textile imports from less developed
countries and demonstrates how these agreements disrupted global trade patterns.
Chapter 3 defines China’s role in the global textile industry in greater depth. It
first explains the structure of China’s textile industry, both before and after 1978. It then
details the reforms China implemented into its textile industry and how these reforms
contributed to China’s role in the global textile trade. It also explains how GATTendorsed trade negotiations affected Chinese textile production and how China responded
to the limitations on textile exports.
The changes to China’s textile industry described in Chapter 3 led to a
tremendous increase in textile exports over the last three decades. China has taken a
continually larger share of the global textile market, whereas the U.S. has watched its
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market share dwindle over the same period. Chapter 4 thus outlines the history of trade
disputes and negotiations between the U.S. and China since 1978. It begins with a
discussion of trade agreements throughout the 1980s and 1990s and demonstrates how
increasing limitations from the U.S. did little to slow imports. It then details textile
lobbyists' current efforts to slow Chinese imports through tactics such as mandatory
exchange-rate reform.
The paper finally concludes with an outlook for U.S. interest groups in their battle
for protectionism against China and for China’s future as a textile producing giant.
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Chapter 1:
Reforms to the Chinese Economy, 1978 — Present

China's modern-day textile industry came of age in an era of reform, often even
serving as the pioneer industry for the reforms themselves. Thus, an investigation of the
textile sector of the Chinese economy first requires a broader understanding of the
country’s economy as a whole. This chapter will examine the state of the Chinese
economy and the reforms it has undergone during the last three decades. Later in the
text, Chapter 3 will present the development of the textile industry within this larger
framework.
China has followed an interesting and unusual path of development. After World
War II, as countries around the globe tried to remodel their economies in the new era of
large-scale global trade, China adopted communism and all but removed itself from
world markets. The country’s role in global trade was limited, and its imports and
exports were managed exclusively by the Ministry of Foreign Trade.
China finally re-opened its doors to the world in 1978 and has experienced a
phenomenal level of economic growth ever since. As shown in figure 1.1 below, China s
average annual GDP growth from 1980 to 2006 was over 9.5 percent.* In comparison,
U.S. GDP growth for the same period was below three percent.^ This graph, compiled

' World Economic Outlook Database. ’‘Report for Selected Countries and Subjects.
October 2007. International Monetary Fund. 25 March 2008. <
http://www.imforg/external/pubs/ft/weo/2007/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=1980&ey=2
008&scsm=1 &ssd= 1 &sort=country&ds=.&br= 1 &pr 1.x=84&pr 1.y=4&c=924%2C 111 &s
-NGDP_RPCH%2CNGDPD%2CNGDPDPC%2CPPPPC%2CPPPEX%2CBCA%2CBC
A_NGDPD&grp=0&a=>
“ World Economic Outlook Database
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from data from the International Monetary Fund,shows that China’s economy was
performing exceptionally well during these years, and it is projected to continue to do so
in the near future. A prolonged period of exceptional economic growth in a country is
not unprecedented, but it has only occurred twice before—first in Japan from 1955 to
1973 and then in several East Asian economies from 1982 to 1996.^ China’s ongoing
growth surge thus demands a look at the factors driving the country's economic success.

Figure 1.1^

China’s recent economic boom began when Deng Xiaoping became head of the
Chinese Communist Party(CCP)in December 1978. For nearly 30 years prior, China
had remained relatively isolated from the world under the policies of CCP leader Mao
Zedong. Mao, who had come to power as the leader of the People’s Republic of China

^ Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth (Cambridge, MA:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 2007) 143
World Economic Outlook Database
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(PRC)in 1949. had hoped to create a self-sufficient communist economy in China. As
per his direction, China adopted the '‘command economy"’ system from the Soviet Union.
Under this system, the state, rather than the market, controlled the economy. The
fundamentals of the command economy included government ownership of all
enterprises, collectivization of agriculture, and central planning. In direct contrast to
capitalist economies such as the U.S., there were no privately owned businesses

or

factories, and consumer demand had a negligible impact on production output. Instead,
government planners issued production targets to firms and directly allocated goods and
resources to different producers.’ The government also controlled prices of goods and
channeled excess profits back into its own hands.
For the most part, Mao’s efforts were unsuccessful, and at the time of his death in
1976 China remained a poor and underdeveloped country. In fact, in 1980 China s GDP
per capita was only U.S. $312, at current prices, compared to over U.S. $12,000 in the
U.S. the same year.^ There were a number of reasons for the failure of Mao s plans, but a
primaiy factor was the lack of coordination between different branches of the command
economy. Planners inefficiently allocated resources to producers, and they determined
output plans for producers based on theory rather than the market. As a result, much
productivity was wasted, and many needs were left unmet.
After Mao’s death in September 1976, leaders in China saw an immediate need
for economic reform. In determining a plan for future development, reformers
recognized two problems with their country: the command economy was wasteful and the

■' Shue Tuck Wong and Sun Sheng Han. “Wither China’s Market Economy? The Case of
Lijin Zhen." (Jan. 1998), 35-36
World Economic Outlook Database

A
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country was a low-income developing country/ In the command economy, government
officials, rather than the market, determined which products to produce and what prices
to charge; thus, product-supply chains were inefficient and unrepresentative of consumer
demands. Resources went to expensive industrial projects, while simple and easily
satisfied demands of consumers were largely ignored. In the long run, most state-run
industrial projects were unsuccessful, and China’s population remained mired in poverty*.
The primary goal of post-Mao reformers, therefore, was to eradicate this trend.
Reformers found the solution in the gradual reduction of access barriers to
markets tor individuals. They acknowledged that individuals and organizations should be
allowed to act entrepreneurially to satisfy simple market demands, so they began their
reforms by slackening state controls over a few small sectors of the economy,

For

instance, rural communities were permitted to set up their own village enterprises and
foreign businesses were granted the right to operate in special economic zones. As the
reformers hoped, the slight relaxation of central planning rules led to increased
investment into the Chinese economy, at the local level by villages and at the macro level
by foreign capital. Because the loosening of central controls was gradual, early reforms
promoted growth but did not seriously threaten the government’s ability to manage and
direct the economy.
Initial reforms only reduced government control over certain pockets within the
planned economy. After the decentralized sectors such as agriculture proved to be
successful in allocating resources and investment, the government allowed reforms to
spread to a wider range of industries, including textiles. Throughout the 1980s the

^ Naughton (2007), 86
* Naughton (2007), 87
11

market became increasingly decentralized, and a growing number of investors entered the
playing field. By the mid-1900s, private activity dominated most sectors ot the
economy.*^ The market determined production output quantities, prices of consumer
goods, and resource supply chains. Government regulation, though still in effect, had
been greatly reduced. The high economic growth rate that had been achieved through
decentralizing reforms indicated that China was successfully moving towards a capiialist
economy. As will be shown in Chapter 3, this trend towards capitalism provided China s
textile industry with the footing it needed to become globally competitive.
A second phase of reform started in the 1990s. This time, reformers aimed to
dissolve the compulsory plan and create uniform rules and tax rates for all sectors ot the
economy.

Today, China is still becoming increasingly capitalist, and its economv

appears able to maintain high economic growth rates for the foreseeable future.
Despite its emphasis on decentralization, the Chinese government has played the
most important role in China’s rapid growth over the last three decades. It has done this
in two ways. First, it has sustained a high level of investment for the duration of the
reform period. Second, it has maintained the necessary level of control over the
country’s varying industries as the country transitions from a communist to socio
capitalist economy. A graphical representation of Chinese investment is shown in Figure
1.2. A detailed look at the government’s influence on the Chinese textile industry/ will
follow in a subsequent chapter.

^ Li Kui-Wai.'The Two Decades of Chinese Economic Reform Compared.” No Date.
APEC Study Centre City University of Hong Kong. 22 April 2008.
<http://unpanl.un.org/intradoc'groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN002826.pdf>
Li Kui-Wai
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In Figure 1.2. total capital formation refers to the transfer of funds from
government savings to the business sector, with the intention of increased economic
output. Fixed capital formation refers to funds invested in concrete assets such as
buildings and roads. The graph demonstrates how the government has played an active
role in China’s increased infrastructure and economic growth.
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Figure 1.2
As shown in the graph, government investment in fixed capital formation has
remained at over 25 percent of GDP since 1978 and is currently increasing. Actually,
government investment made up a substantial portion of GDP during the Maoist era, but
it had predominantly gone to inefficient large-scale projects. Since the implementation of
Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, most investment over the last 30 years has instead gone into
fixed capital formation. This means that whereas pre-reform investment was wasted on
unprofitable ventures, current investment in fixed capital formation corresponds to new
factories, roads, housing, and other concrete forms of infrastructure. Increased
11

Naughton (2007), 145
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infrastructure has helped domestic development in China maintain pace with marketdriven economic growth. High investment levels combined with more open markets thus
work together in sustaining China's exceptional growth rates.
Exports have also been a significant factor in China's rapid growth. 2007
12

estimates point China’s current account surplus at U.S. $363.3 billion,

In comparison.

for the same year the U.S. has an estimated current account deficit of U.S. $-747.1

billion.13 Although higher value goods such electronics have gained an increasing share
of manufactures exports in recent years, textiles and apparel have been the leading source
of foreign exchange for decades. In 2006 textiles made up approximately half of total
14

Chinese merchandise exports,

Textile manufacturing is thus a highly important sector

of the Chinese economy, and is treated as such.
In fact, U.S. textile lobbyists are currently using China’s huge current account
surplus in their argument against textile imports from China. In recent years textile and
other manufacturing coalitions in the U.S. have made claims that the Chinese government
has artificially devalued its currency exchange rate, thereby making its exports cheaper.
Chapter 4 will discuss this subject in greater detail.
The reforms to the Chinese economy laid the framework for increased growth in
its textile manufacturing sector. Many of the improvements to the industry that will be
covered in Chapter 3 would not have been possible without government decentralization
or increased spending on infrastructure. The focus of the next chapter will veer from
12

The World Factbook. “China.” 15 April, 2008. Central Intelligence Agency. 20 April
2008.
< https://ww'w.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html>
13'
rhe World Factbook
14

Country Profiles. “China.” April 2008. The World Trade Organization. 16 April 2008.
<http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=
CN>
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China for a moment to provide an overview of the global textile industry. Chapter 3 will
then discuss China’s textile industry within the context of both China’s internal economic
developments and changes to the textile world as a whole.
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Chapter 2:
History of the Global Textile Industry

rhe modern-day textile manufacturing industry was born in Great Britain during
the Industrial Revolution at the end of the eighteenth century. Until then, European
consumers imported silk and other cloths from China and India, but the exotic cloths
were a luxury item only to be afforded by the rich. Average citizens typically dressed in
locally produced wool and often made their clothes themselves.
The invention of the spinning jenny by James Hargreaves in 1770 suddenly
increased the amount of cotton yarn that one worker could produce by eightfold. New
innovations rapidly followed, and the industry has since evolved tremendously.
Throughout the 1800s, production spread to continental Europe and to the United States,
and textile mills 2ire now found in almost every comer of the globe. Today textile and
apparel manufacturing endures as the largest source of industrial employment in the
15

world, with over 200 countries producing for the international market.
The modern-day textile trade really took off at the end of World War ll. In the
aftermath of the war, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade(GATT)imposed a
system of regulations on world trade markets. The efforts of this new global organization
opened the world to a higher degree of free trade than ever before experienced.
Furthermore, economic growth around the world in the 1950s and 1960s allowed
countries to build more production facilities while simultaneously increasing consumer
demand. At the same time, technological advances in transportation and communication.
Kiltv G Dickerson. Textiles and Apparel in the Global Economy(New Jersey: Prentice
Hall, 1995)4

such as jel-propeI!ed aircraft and farther-reaching telephone networks, facilitated global
interaction and trade, fhe revisions to global trade networks had a tremendous impact

on

the textile industry. Until World War II, most countries produced textiles primarily for
their own domestic consumption. The decreased barriers on trade as mandated by
GATT, however, lead to a 7-foId increase in international textile trade between 1945 and
1975.
Another reason for the rapid increase in global textile irade lies in the nature of
the textile industry. The manufacture of textiles requires little capital or technology, but
it can provide employment for large numbers of people. After World War II, as Jessdeveloped countries(LDC’s)tried to shift from agriculture to industry-based economies,
they found textile manufacturing the easiest industry to promote. Because of the low cost
of labor in developing countries, the start-up textile manufacturing plants were able to
produce for a fraction of the cost of those in developed countries. When cheap imports
began to arrive in industrialized countries, the modern-day textile trade was underwa>
Because growth in the global industry left thousands jobless in the U S. and
Kurope, the surge in textile production prompted an international dispute over textile
trade regulations that is still going on today. The first calls of protest against imports
came from U.S. textile workers in response to incoming textiles and clothing from Japan
after World War II. In effort to slow the inflow of low-cost goods from Japan, the U.S.
negotiated a voluntary export restraint(VER)from its Eastern competitor after Japan

Dickerson, 39
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joined the GATT in the mid-1950s.

The U.S. expected this negotiation to allow

domestic textile mills to maintain their competitiveness. As an unintended consequence
of the agreement, however, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea expanded their
production capacities and soon took Japan’s place as cheap suppliers of textiles.
Though countries around the globe developed textile manufacturing industries in
the post-colonial world. East Asia quickly became the source of most global textile
production for export. Much of Latin America adopted the import-substitutionindustrialization strategy of development, and Africa lacked the technology and capital to
produce a competitive textile export sector. Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea, on
the other hand, immediately began manufacturing textiles for export. At this point, China
remained largely isolated from global trade under the auspices of communism.
By the 1960’s, most industrialized countries began to feel the impact of lowerpriced imports of textiles from newly industrializing countries(NIC’s). To prevent job
loss in the developed world, the GATT passed the Short-Term Arrangement(STA)in
1961. The stated intention of this agreement was to limit the “market disruption” caused
18

by competitive goods from the developing world.

The arrangement was a one-year pact

to curb imports of cotton fabrics. At its expiration in 1962, the GATT adopted the LongTerm Arrangement(LTA), which extended constraints on cotton products for five years.
The LTA was then renewed twice, once in 1967 and once in 1970.
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Amy Glasmeier, Jeffery W. Thompson, and Amy J. Kays. “The Geography of Trade
Policy: Trade Regimes and Location Decisions in the Textile and Apparel Complex.”
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers. New Series, Vol. 18, No. 1. 1993: 25
18
Thomas G Moore, China in the World Market: Chinese Industry and International
Sources of Reform in the Post-Mao Era (Cambride, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2002), 64
18

Faced with increasing restrictions from the STA and LTA,textile-producing
NIC’s diversified their production practices and began manufacturing textiles made of
other fibers. As these countries became competitive in artificial and wool products, cries
for increased protectionism were heard once again in Washington. In response, in 1973
the GATT negotiated the Multifibre Arrangement(MFA). The MFA provided the
framework through which GATT members could negotiate bilateral agreements with
textile exporting countries to determine quota allotments of certain textile product
categories. According to the World Trade Organization(WTO),the MFA provided for
the application of selective quantitative restrictions when surges in imports of particular
[textile] products caused, or threatened to cause, serious damage to the industry of the
importing country.”'^ By allowing developed countries to impose heavy quotas on textile
imports, the MFA severely restricted many developing countries’ access to world textile
markets. GATT’s successor, the WTO,later admitted,“The Multifibre Arrangement was
a major departure from the basic GATT rules and particularly the principle of non
discrimination.,,20
After the first MFA expired in 1977, it was renegotiated three times: MFA II
(1977-1981), MFA III (1982-1986) and MFA IV (1986-1991). Only a month after MFA
IV was signed in August 1986, the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations began. A
primary objective of this round of multilateral talks was the liberalization of the textile
trade to bring it within a regulatory framework that followed GATT principles. This
round of negotiations was intended to conclude by December 1990, which would have

Textiles Monitoring Body(TMB).“The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing.” No
date. World Trade Organization. 9 January 2008.
<http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/texti_e/texintro_e.htm>
20
Textiles Monitoring Body
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allowed time for a quota-dismantling system to be in place when MFA IV expired on
July 31, 1991. The talks did not end until December 1993, however, so a phase out for
the MFA could not begin until January 1, 1995. In the meantime, the MFA was
temporarily extended twice to ensure ongoing regulation of the global textile trade.
The MFA severely disrupted global trade patterns in the textile industry. By
allowing some countries more quotas than others, the arrangement more or less dictated
where the bulk of textile manufacturing was oriented. For instance, textile exporters in
some countries invested in production facilities in countries with unused quotas in order
to boost their output. Quota allotments under the MFA also led to the illegal practice of
transshipment of goods through other countries as well as outsourcing unfinished goods
to countries with higher quotas. Moreover, higher quota allotments to Hong Kong and
South Korea allowed them to remain centers of textile production even after their other
light industries moved to less developed regions of Asia. Thus, unlike any other industry,
the history of the modern-day textile trade has been written as much by quota allocation
than by cost advantages.
Because of the market disruption caused by the MFA,GATT’s successor, the
WTO,laid the framework for a 10-year phase-out of the arrangement beginning January
1, 1995. The MFA was replaced by the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
(ATC), which was set to expire on December 31, 2004. Its purpose was to stipulate how
members would integrate the global textile trade back within traditional GATT and WTO
principles. The guidelines for the ATC are as follows:
This process is to be carried out progressively in three stages(3 years, 4 years, 3
years) with all products standing integrated at the end of the 10-year period. The
first stage began on I January 1995 with the integration by Members of products
representing not less than 16 per cent of that Member’s total 1990 imports of all
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the products in the Annex. At stage 2, on 1 January 1998, not less than a further
17 per cent was integrated. At stage 3, on 1 January 2002, not less than a further
18 per cent will be integrated. Finally at the end, on 1 January 2005, all
remaining products(amounting up to 49 per cent of 1990 imports into a Member)
will stand integrated and the Agreement terminates. Each importing Member
decides itself which products it will integrate at each stage to reach these
thresholds. The only constraint is that the integration list must encompass
products from each of the four groupings: tops and yarns, fabrics, made-up textile
products and clothing.^'

Because of the way the ATC was set up, member countries could decide which
items it would remove from quotas on the determined dates. As a result, most importing
countries removed items with less market share first, leaving more popular, more
competitive items for the final removal deadline of January 1, 2005. Many analysts
predicted that this date was a “cliff,” after which a surge of cheap textile imports from
less developed countries would flood U.S. and European markets, causing job loss and
disrupting existing trade flows in the industry. Most of these imports were expected to
come from China, a country with an abundance ofcheap labor that was already
maximizing its quota allocations.
Experts were correct in their prediction that China would see a significant
increase in market share of textile and apparel exports after the expiration of the ATC. In
2005, total world clothing exports rose by almost U.S.$ 16.5 billion, or 6.4 percent, from
22

the previous year.

That year, China’s clothing exports alone rose by $12.3 billion, or

21

Textiles Monitoring Body
Micheal F. Martin, “U.S. Clothing and Textile Trade with China and the World: Trends
Since the End of Quotas.” CRS Report for Congress.(Washington: Congressional
Research Service, July 10, 2007)6

22
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19.9 percent.-"' This means that China captured nearly 75 percent of the world’s increase
in textile exports in the year following the ATC’s expiration.
India saw the second largest growth in clothing exports, with an increased market
share of 10.1 percent between 2004 and 2005. The losers in the arrangement were Hong
Kong, with an 11.1 percent decline in exports. South Korea, with a 23.9 percent decline,
Taiwan with a 20.0 percent decline, Mexico with a 2.9 percent decline, and the United
24

States with a 0.4 percent decline,

Most other major clothing exporters experienced

modest growth in the industry during the time period.
In terms of textiles, growth in China’s market share of exports between 2004 and
25

2005 equaled total world growth in textile exports that year,

Its own year on year

growth in textile exports was 8.2 percent. Contrary to predictions, the U.S. actually
experienced an increased growth in market share of 5.1 percent. This does not actually
reflect a win for U.S. textile manufacturers, however, as the number ofjobs in the sector
26

fell by 5.6 percent that year,

The biggest loser in the textile sector was Germany,
27

whose textile exports fell by 20.1 percent.
It appears that in the years to come, China will continue to dominate the global
textile and apparel industries. The U.S. is poised to prolong its fight against textile and
clothing imports from China with new weapons such as calls for currency reform. It is
unlikely, however, that continued protectionism of the industry will slow imports from

23

Martin, 6
Martin, 7
25
Martin, 8
26
Trade and Job Statistics. “Textile and Apparel Job Losses.” No Date. America
Manufacturing Trade Action Coalition. 16 April 2008. <
http://www.amtacdc.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/Amtac/Chart%20Images/J-C6.pdf>
27
Martin, 8
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China or any lesser-developed countries. In respect to textile and apparel exports, China
is on top of the world, and it will most likely remain there for the foreseeable future. The
next two chapters will explain why.
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Chapter 3:
China’s Role in the Global Textile Trade

China's path to its position as the world’s largest textile exporter has been marked
by constant innovation in response to ever-tightening restrictions on its access to world
markets. It endured its first textile trade dispute with the U.S. in late 1977, and in 1979 it
experienced a unilateral ban on several types of textile products after the U.S. found the
country's officials uncooperative during negotiation talks. The first bilateral agreement
on textiles between the U.S. and China was reached in 1980. At this time, the Chinese
textile industry was state-owned and operated, and it was riddled with inefficiencies.
When subsequent bilateral agreements with the U.S. and E.U. expanded quotas to a wider
array of Chinese textiles, it became apparent that these inefficiencies could demise
Chinese competitiveness in the industry. Thus, throughout the 1980s China vastly
restructured its textile manufacturing sector, and in less than two decades it was the
largest in the world.

Section 3.1
China^s Textile Production and Trade 1949-1978

In 1949 China’s new communist government created the Ministry of Textile
Industry (MTI)to manage the country’s domestic textile production. Prior to the
establishment of MTI, resources invested in the textile industry were scattered and
inefficiently employed. Furthermore, a new government mandate to use domestically
grown cotton presented a supply problem to textile factories, which were consolidated in
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coastal cities such as Shanghai, Qingdao, and Tianjin. MTI thus sought to consolidate
the industry under central control. After 1949 it dictated the entire production supply
chain from raw fibers to finished goods. According to its rules, natural fibers were
procured by state purchasing and supply bureaus and were in turn distributed to textile
producers run by either MTI or the provincial or city textile bureaus. Imported raw
materials were similarly allocated to factories by foreign trade departments. Finished
fabrics were then distributed to garment factories by MTI itself. Finally, the relevant
branches of the Ministry of Commerce system oversaw the distribution of finished goods.
In actuality, much of the every-day decision-making was done by provincial or
city bureaus at the local level rather than by MTI,especially during the 1950s and 60s.
Nevertheless, individual enterprises had virtually no involvement in production decisions.
Because of the central control, therefore, factories and individuals had little incentive for
innovation or increased productivity. Later, as China attempted to boost its textile
exports during the reform era, this lack of incentive presented a major problem to the
national textile industry.
MTl’s role in the textile industry stopped short of foreign trade; this was handled
exclusively by the central government. To manage imports and exports in all sectors,
China’s Ministry of Foreign Trade created several state-controlled foreign trade
corporations(FTCs), each of which enjoyed a monopoly in importing and exporting
goods in its specific product area. For textiles, this FTC was the China National Textiles
Import and Export Corporation (Chinatex). After its establishment in 1961, all textile
and apparel products were purchased by Chintex before reaching overseas markets.
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Throughout the Maoist era, China’s textile industry plodded along under central
planning directives. It was relatively productive, but resources were often wasted, and
innovation was nonexistent. It was not until the government implemented extensive
reforms that the industry became the powerhouse that it is today.

Section 3.2
The Success of China’s Textile Industry in the Reform Era (1978-present)

Success in China’s textile industry did not happen overnight; throughout the
1980s the production and export system of Chinese textiles was highly inefficient. In
terms of production, China was at a disadvantage due to its shortage of supplies,
outmoded technology, reputation for low-quality goods, lack of coordination between
buyers and producers, and a myriad of other problems. When it began to engage in largescale foreign trade, China’s textile export sector also suffered from setbacks such as
inexperience in managing quotas, foreign accusations of dumping, depressed prices, and
untimely delivery. Ne£irly all of the problems with China’s textile production and export
had arisen because of the central planning system, and they all had to be amended before
China could become globally competitive in the industry. China could not simply turn
the industry into the hands of the market, however, so the government gradually applied
reforms as needed, both to the textile industry and to China’s economy as a whole. As the
government slowly relinquished its control over textile production and export to the
private sector during the late 1980s and early 1990s, the industry began to flourish. Mills
became more efficient, communication increased between buyers and sellers, production
time was reduced, and product quality grew better. Most importantly, exports surged.
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Figure 3.1 shows the growth in China’s textile exports for the period 1980 to
2001. in terms of million U.S. dollars at current prices. This specific time period is
displayed because 2001 is the year China joined the WTO,and statistics are not available
for years prior to 1980.
The surges in growth in the late 1980s and again in the mid 1990s correspond to
actions taken by the Chinese government to decentralize the industry, which will be
discussed later. Of course outside factors such as global market demand and price
fluctuations also contributed to the growth trend, but it is evident that government
reforms played a large part in the overall success of China’s textile export industry.
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Figure 3.1
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In comparison to the astronomically large volume of textile exports in the late
1990s and today, China's textile output during the early 1980s appears low. In actuality,
however, by 1982 the total value of China’s textile exports surpassed that of the U.S.
Even before Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, China’s large labor force combined with its low
wage rates allowed China to manufacture products more cheaply than more developed
countries. Thus, even though factories in developed countries enjoyed higher
productivity, China had a tremendous comparative advantage. Its problem was that its
products were of low quality, and its production mechanisms were highly inefficient.
Because Chinese textile output was so high even before the industry’s multitude
of problems had been remedied, reformers saw enormous potential in the industry. It was
already the country’s leading foreign exchange earner, and it appeeired poised for
improvements that could significantly increase returns. It thus became the pioneer
industry for reform. These early reforms, combined with its natural comparative
advantage in textile production skyrocketed China into its position as the world’s leading
textile exporter. Figure 3.2 expands the look at China’s textile exports through 2006 and
demonstrates its clear lead over its competitors by the turn of the century.
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Figure 3.2

Figures 3.1 and 3.2 both show that China’s textile sector had many problems
during the 1980s. These problems really came to light when China became a signatory to
the MFA in 1983. Until then, China’s export tactic for all sectors had been to ship large
30

quantities of low-quality goods at prices lower than those of its competitors.

This

method befitted China well at the time, because poor coordination due to central planning
directives often led to overproduction, which was compensated for by increased exports.
With increased restrictions under the MFA, however, China could no longer employ this
strategy in the export of apparel and textiles. Planners recognized that if textile
manufacturing was to remain China’s leading foreign exchange earner, major reforms to
the industry were needed. They immediately set about improving nearly every aspect of
both the production and export processes. A decade later, their reforms had transformed
China into a textile giant, and progress has not slowed since.
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To expand its textile exports in the face of the MFA, China had five options:
upgrade into production of higher value added goods; diversify production into goods not
covered by quotas; imorove utilization of existing quotas; move production abroad;
and/or illegally transship goods through countries with excess quota. China eventually
made use of all of these strategies to varying degrees, but some proved more successful
than others.
Overall, produet upgrading became the primary focus of reforms. The
government recognized that this tactic was necessary both to expand China’s textile
industry and to discard its reputation for poor-quality goods.^* Upgrading to higherquality products would increase the unit value per good exported, and thus bring greater
returns back to China. At the same time, improving China’s reputation would bring more
buyers to the country.
At first, industry officials tried use central directives to accomplish their goal of
scaling up production into higher-value goods. They encountered many difficulties,
though, mainly because they were unused to the new system of trade with the rest of the
world. People working in the textile sector, as in all industrial sectors in China, had come
of age in an era of complete government control. They lived in absence of personal
incentive to produce anything better or more efficiently, and they had little concept of
profits. Thus, when reformers first tried to implement improved methods of production,
workers were unreceptive.
To illustrate the effects of central planning on production, Pietra Rivoli, author of
The Travels ofa T-Shirt in the Global Economy, visited a state-owned textile mill in
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Shanghai in 2000. The mill, effectively named Number 36 Cotton Yam Factory, is now
managed by Tao Yong Fang, who individually determines factors such as what to
produce, where to sell, whom to hire, what to pay, and so on. Today it is an efficient and
competitive business. When Tao was assigned to the Number 36 mill in 1983, however,
things were different. Rivoli writes,
‘Tao, the workers, and the factory itself were cogs in the wheel of China’s central
economic planning machine, with no room at all for initiative, no reason to be in a
hurry. Well into the 1980s, the central planners delivered set quantities of cotton
bales, machinery, and factory workers to the doorstep, and came back later to
collect the production quota of yarn [...] For 35 years the spindles in the Number
36 mill clattered, and no one working in the mill had to decide anything.”^^
The situation of the Number 36 mill was characteristic of textile mills across the
country in the early 1980s. Even managers had no say in the style, quality, or quantity of
output, and they had no concept of financial responsibility. Thus, initial government
commands to improve and diversify the goods produced were met with little success
because factory workers had no incentive to do so.
Even as the government tried to issue orders, its own actions made following
these orders more difficult. The first of these counter-productive actions was a
government-directed rise in raw material prices. In the early 1980s the state raised the
price of cotton in effort to support agricultural reform. The climbing cotton prices did not
coincide with higher finished textile prices, however, so mills became even more
reluctant to improve output quality. When the state finally adjusted textile purchase
prices to better reflect the cost of production, it did so uniformly, with no consideration to
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quality differentiation. In this way, China’s state-controlled prices served as a further
disincentive for product upgrading.
Yet another setback was the requirement that the foreign trade corporation
Chinatex handle all foreign trade in textiles £ind apparel. Chinatex’s role as a middleman
created several problems. First, it eliminated all contact between Chinese domestic
producers and foreign buyers. The lack of communication with the world market
rendered Chinese producers unable to fully meet consumer demands or to make timely
deliveries of products. Second, because Chinatex had a monopoly on the Chinese textile
trade, it expanded its foreign exchange earnings buy squeezing prices on domestic
manufacturers in order to undercut its global competitors. Once again, this process only
made producers less willing to produce better quality goods.
Because of the aforementioned problems, initial efforts towards product
upgrading and diversification of Chinese textile products did not generate substantial
results. Yet in this respect the textile industry was not alone; most of China’s
manufacture-for-export sectors were experiencing the same difficulties. Therefore, in
1984 the State Council promulgated a set of trade reforms aimed at eliminating Chinese
33

industry isolation from world markets.

The most important reform in this package was

deeming individual enterprises responsible for their own profits and losses, with FTC’s
(Chinatex, in the case of textiles) acting simply as sales agents. This allowed textile
purchase prices to become better aligned with the world market. It also finally gave mills
incentive to upgrade their product quality. A look back at the graph in Figure 3.1 shows
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that this move corresponded to a significant rise in Chinese textile exports in the later half
of the 1980s.
In 1988, the government granted certain textile factories direct export rights,
which allowed them to negotiate autonomously with foreign buyers rather than relying on
Chinatex for market information. This move marked a turning point in the history of
China's textile industry, as it gave manufacturers both the ability and incentive to quickly
respond to changes in consumer demand. The number of factories granted these rights
was limited at first, but the ones that were able to autonomously export their products
reported significantly improved performance. One textile mill in Shanghai even claimed
an increase of U.S $1 per equivalent square meter for its goods compared to what it
34

received when its export sales were handled by Chinatex.

Due to the success of the

factories initially granted autonomous export rights, the number of enterprises with these
privileges had grown to over 600 by 1995. Today, these rights have been extended to all
enterprises, as one of the provisions of China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 was that
China open its markets and allow all Chinese and foreign businessmen to import and
export on their own. Many enterprises still operate through middlemen, and Chinatex
remains China’s largest exporter of textiles, but the increased access to market
information caused by the opening of the market sparked a significant increase in
quantity and quality of output.
In 1991, the Chinese government significantly opened trade by eliminating
advantages formerly enjoyed by Special Economic Zones(SEZ’s). This action meant
that trade entities operating in these zones would no longer receive preferential treatment
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for foreign exchange retention that allowed them to offer lower bids for domestically
produced goods that they purchased for export. Finally, that same year, China granted
regional Chinatcx branches the right to buy goods from factories outside their home
province. This significantly boosted competition in the textile industry and led to great
efficiency gains.
As the government tried to reform textile production facilities and liberalize trade,
another problem with textile exports remained. This was the inefficient allocation of
quota. Following the completion of its first textile trading agreement with the U.S. in
1980, China gave total control of quota allocations to Chinatex. Chinatex itself then
determined which factories received how much quota. It was later determined, however,
that Chinatex based most of its distributions on political connections rather than size or
35

performance of each enterprise,

In 1986 the government thus removed control of quota

allocations from Chinatex and in turn gave this authority to the Ministry of Foreign
Economic Relations and Trade(MOFERT). This action proved upsetting at first; by mid36

1987 foreign traders claimed that China had used its entire yearly quota.

The situation

improved slightly in the proceeding years, as MOFERT made an attempt to more-fairly
37

allocate quota based on performance and unit value of products.

Still, for political

reasons, most quota went to enterprises that exported through Chinatex rather than
38

directly, so autonomously exporting enterprises encountered further setbacks.
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Not surprisingly, as the MFA and renewed bilateral agreements tightened
restrictions, quota came to be increasingly traded on the black market. Quota also came
to represent a large part of contract negotiations between Chinese producers and foreign
buyers. One American buyer stated,
“The fact that we area a multibillion dollar company seems to mean precious little
in China sometimes. Everywhere we went[when we first entered China] we were
offered ridiculously low quota,just like any other player trying to get in. And^
often the quota we got was for categories we didn’t even want! Even today, it s
very hard to do business on a year-to-year basis. We’ve tried to buy the entire
quota for a particular category from the officials who controlled it, offering them
considerably more than they had received the year before. We were rejected,
however. The whole process remains a mystery a lot of the time.”
Finally, MOFERT initiated a quota auction system in 1994. The idea had been
discussed in previous years, but it was initially disregeirded due to the belief that an
auction would raise quota prices, which would in turn raise the price of goods."^^ In the
end, the auction system ended up providing further incentive for factories to move up the
value chain of production in order to receive higher export prices that compensated for
quota expenses.
All in all, efforts of government officials to reform China’s textile production and
quota allocation systems produced tremendous results. Efforts of individuals to move
production abroad and transship goods through third countries also served as facilitators
to growth, albeit on not as large a scale. By the early 1990s, Chinese clothing was
appearing in higher-end department stores such as Saks Fifth Avenue and Macy’s, and by
41

the end of the decade, this was common.
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Foday. Chinese clothing and textile manufactures have successfully made their
way to the top of the world. Their products are no longer limited to T-shirts and low
quality goods, but instead extend to a wide array of clothing fabrics and styles. The
elimination of the middleman barrier between domestic producers and foreign buyers has
allowed China to respond quickly to changes in consumer demands. At the same time,
the end of quota restrictions on certain fiber categories has allowed China to produce
larger quantities of a greater variety of materials.
Because Chinese textile and apparel manufacturing now extends into more
categories than ever before, producers in the U.S. are looking for new ways to fight back.
The final chapter of this paper will discuss the actions of the U.S. and China in their
battle over the textile trade.
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Chapter 4:
U.S.- Chinese Trade Relations Concerning Textiles
China's history of trade in textiles with the U.S. is one of multiple bilateral
agreements and restrictive quotas. As mentioned above, the U.S. textile industry has
been under serious threat for three decades. In the last 12 years alone, 302,800 textile
workers(63% of the textile labor force) have lost their jobs because of U.S. mills’
42

inability to compete with cheap imports from NICs.

The global textile trade is thus a

personal matter for many, and politicians have done their best to make it as much a
political issue as an economic one. As China has grown into a textile producing giant,
the U.S. has battled imports from the country with all its might. To date, the U.S. and
China have negotiated a total of five bilateral textile agreements. Although each
agreement has been successful in curbing Chinese imports to a degree,job loss in the
43

U.S. textile and apparel manufacturing industry has not slowed,

Furthermore, as shown

in Figure 4.1 China is winning an ever-increasing share of U.S. textile imports.
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Figure 4.1

The U.S. will lose its right to impose quotas on any Chinese textile or apparel
product at the end of 2008; thus, domestic manufacturers are seeking new ways to limit
the inflow of Chinese goods into the U.S. market. Today, as the MFA and quota
regulations recede into the past, China’s currency exchange rate is moving to the
forefront of the battle.

Section 4.1:
Relations Prior to the ATC expiration, 1978-2004

The first dispute between the U.S. and China over textile imports came in late
1977. That year, a petition against a textile import from China was filed with the United
States International Trade Commission under Section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974,
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which deals with market disruption by imports from communist countries,

The ITC’s

investigation found that there was no market disruption, but the conflict between U.S. and
Chinese textile interests was thereafter a subject of controversy. U.S. officials then made
several attempts to negotiate a bilateral agreement restricting Chinese textile exports to
the U.S. Chinese officials proved unwilling to negotiate, however,so in 1979 the U.S.
unilaterally imposed quantitative restrictions on nine textile product categories.
In September 1980, a formal bilateral agreement on textile trade was finally
signed between the US and China. It allowed quota restrictions on six textile product
categories to increase at a rate of 3 to 4 percent each year over the life of the agreement.
This agreement was very mild compared to what was to come. Just as Japan’s VER on
textiles in the 1950's led to a surge of textile imports from other East Asian countries, the
first restrictive agreement against textile imports from China had unintended
consequences. After the signing of this agreement, Chinese exports of items not under
quota restrictions skyrocketed. In 1981, Chinese sales of textiles in the U.S. market
46

increased by two-thirds.

A U.S. attempt to negotiate a more restrictive agreement

failed, so in January 1983 a new unilateral agreement was imposed on China that
substantially increased the number of items under quota restrictions. In a crafty response,
the Chinese suspended their imports of chemical fibers, cotton, soybeans, and wheat from
the U.S. until internal pressure from politicians caused the U.S. government to
renegotiate an agreement and stop the Chinese boycott of U.S. commodities. In August
1983 trade between the two countries resumed as normal, but due to continued
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disagreements their relations never improved.
As China's reforms to its textile sector rendered production and export more
efficient, increased imports from the country made their way into the U.S. each year. The
imports caused greater protest from the already failing U.S. domestic mills, which in turn
led to continual negotiations between the U.S. and China. When China became a
signatory to the MFA in 1983 it was thereafter subject to a string of bilateral agreements
with the U.S., each one harsher than the last.
As a provision of the MFA,an importing country had the right to make
“consultation calls," in which an importing country can request a negotiation to limit
items from previously un-restricted product categories. In the mid-1980s US “calls”
surged, which raised the percentage of Chinese textile exports subject to quotas to over
47

75 percent during the second Sino-American textile agreement 1983-1987.
Faced with a multitude of restrictions, China was dissatisfied with the MFA and
was extremely reluctant to sign MFA IV in 1986. MFA III had already been negotiated
when China signed in 1983, so China was unable to participate in discussions that year.
This time, China strongly objected to the inclusion of ramie and other previously
unrestricted fibers into MFA IV, believing that the effort was primarily designed to limit
48

China’s ability to expand its textile exports.

Furthermore, one of the stated long-term

goals of the MFA was the eventual liberalization of the textile trade, but additional
restrictions under MFA IV seemed only to provide further setbacks. Despite its protests,
however, China ultimately signed the arrangement, and China and the U.S. negotiated a
third bilateral textile agreement to go into effect at the expiration of the second agreement
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on December 31. 1Q87.
The third agreement lasted until December 31, 1993 and placed restrictions on all
major categories other than silk. It allowed an average annual growth rate in quotas of3
percent, which was lenient compared to the 1 percent annual growth rate allowed Hong
Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea but well below the MFA’s suggested ceiling of6
49

percent.

It was during the period of the third Sino-American textile agreement that

Chinese transshipment of goods to avoid quotas became widespread. This practice
received increased attention in Washington, and Sino-American relations concerning the
textile trade soured.
In 1991, U.S. Customs investigations found that Chinese transshipment of
50

products through third countries was a prevalent practice.

U.S. Customs and the

Internal Revenue Service then launched an extensive operation called Operation Q-Tip,
in which 139 businesses involved in importing and marketing Chinese textiles in the U.S.
51

were investigated for fraudulent transshipment practices.

The U.S. government charged
52

that Chinese textile shipments to the U.S. had been devalued by as much as $2.1 billion.
By the end of the investigation in 1993, however, U.S. Customs had convicted only one
case involving two companies and two individuals who were found guilty of illegally
importing textiles valued at $2.7 million.
Although Operation Q-Tip failed to produce any substantial evidence of
Chinese transshipments of textiles, the practice remained at the forefront of U.S.-Chinese
talks for a fourth textile agreement. The Chinese government acknowledged
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transshipments as a problem, but refused to take full responsibility for evasion of quotas
53

by Chinese companies, as the U.S. had asked,

China argued that the U.S. and China

should instead share the role of enforcement. In effect, negotiations broke down in late
1993. and in January 1994 the U.S. announced that it would unilaterally impose quota
reductions of 25 to 35 percent on 88 product categories of textiles and apparels.^'^ This
move brought China back to the bargaining table, and a less-harsh agreement was
reached in mid-January 1994. The fourth agreement, which lasted until December 31,
1996. lowered annual quota growth rates to zero in 1994 and 1 percent thereafter, and it
covered silk products for the first time. China’s only notable concession from this
agreement was reprieve from the harsher sanctions originally proposed by the U.S.
The fifth agreement, which covered the period from January 1, 1997 to December
31, 2000, was marked by significant gains in US access to the Chinese market. Whereas
previous agreements had focused solely on US imports from China, this agreement
declared that China’s continued access to US markets was conditional upon China’s own
55

lowering of trade barriers.

In Washington, the signing of the fifth agreement was

considered a major achievement in US trade negotiations with China. Not only did it
grant more concessions to U.S. business in China, it also allowed Washington the option
of imposing unilateral quotas on an emergency basis in the event of a surge in Chinese
textile exports to the United States through December 31, 2008. This means that Chinese
textiles are subject to restrictions even after the ATC expiration on December 31, 2004.
China, on the other hand, won little from this agreement, and actually received a 300
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percent quota reduction.
In anticipation of the ATC expiration, textiles were a subject of much discussion
in China's accession to the WTO in 2001. As one provision to its membership, China
agreed to allow WTO members to utilize two safeguard mechanisms in the event that its
»57

imports cause or threaten to cause domestic ‘‘market disruption,

The first safeguard

mechanism applies only to textiles and apparel and can be invoked by any member
country requesting a consultation with China. Requesting consultation immediately
imposes a quota on the product equal to 6 or 7.5 percent ofthe imported quota over the
58

previous twelve months,

The act requires no WTO notification, and the quota can

remain in place for one year without China’s agreement. This safeguard mechanism
expires December 31, 2008. The second safeguard mechanism is available until
December 10, 2013, and applies to all Chinese imports. In this case, the reporting
country must notify the WTO and its consultation must be deemed justified. If China is
found to be in the wrong, the WTO member can impose quotas, tariffs, or other forms of
59

import restrictions for up to three years.
As the deadline for removal of quotas on Chinese textiles nears, it seems that the
days of protectionism are coming to an end. But U.S. domestic mills have not given up
the battle against imports. For them,the issue is political, and they appear willing to fight
for their jobs at all costs.
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Section 4.2:
Exchange Rates Controversy, 2005 — Present

Textile producers in the U.S. are now using the currency issue as ammunition in
their battle against imports from China. Sensing that their cries for protectionism in the
form of quotas have sounded their last, textile lobbyists have begun pressuring Congress
for legislation concerning China's undervalued exchange rate. Today,the currency
60

exchange rate is 7.01 Chinese Yuan to 1 U.S. dollar.

Legislators in the U.S. almost

unanimously agree that this rate is severely skewed. Exact measurements of the degree
of misalignment are impossible to extract, but many economists and law-makers believe
that China's Yuan is undervalued by as much as 40 percent. This misalignment makes
Chinese exports cheaper and gives China a big price advantage when competing with
goods produced domestically in the U.S.
From the Chinese perspective, an undervalued currency is advantageous to trade,
as it allows them to export more than they otherwise would. More-developed countries
sense an unfairness about this practice, however, as they cannot devalue their currency as
China has. Manufactures lobbyists in the United States, therefore, are pressuring
Congress to pass new laws concerning currency exchange rates. They hope that if China
is forced to realign its currency, the number of Chinese imports will fall.
The affects of currency misalignment can be demonstrated using simple
economics. According to the Ricardian theory of trade, goods will naturally be produced
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in the country that has a comparative advantage in the production of that good. Put
simply, goods will always be produced where it is cheapest to make them. The cost of
making a good is found by multiplying the wage rate by the number of labor units
required to produce one unit of that good. In the case of the textile trade between the
U.S. and China, it is obviously cheaper to produce goods in China. This can be
demonstrated in the formula
Pc* - wc*^ * ac^ < Pus^ ~ Wus^ * aus^
Where P is the cost of textiles, w is the wage rate, and a is the unit requirement of labor.
C stands for China, US for the United States, and T for textiles.
Right now, as the formula shows. Pc* < Pus\ or, the cost of producing textiles in
China is less than in the U.S. because wage rates are lower there. Yet when the two
countries trade, the currency exchange rate becomes a factor in the cost equation. The
U.S. and China have two different currencies, the dollar and the yuan. Because of this,
T

China’s production cost of textiles, in terms of US dollars, must be found by dividing Pc
by the exchange rate. For instance, if Pc*^ is 16 yuan, and the exchange rate is 8 yuan per
dollar, then Pc^ is 2 dollars. If the exchange rate is cut to 4 yuan per dollar, though,Pc^
will increase to 4 dollars. This theory thus explains why it is beneficial to China to keep
its currency undervalued, and why the U.S. finds it a problem.
In early 2008, Cass Johnson, president of the National Council of Textile
Organizations, said that the action on the currency issue is especially important at the
moment because all remaining quotas on Chinese textile and apparel imports are due to
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be removed at the end of this year.

He slated, “When foreign governments play dirty to

gain a competitive advantage, our government should respond, and at the very least,
provide US companies with adequate tools to defend themselves.
Together with other manufacturing coalitions, textile producers have succeeded in
making currency valuations a subject of discussion in Congress. As noted in their cries,
in 2006 the IJ.S. trade deficit with China reached U.S. $232.5 billion, as imports grew 18
63

percent.

Legislators have taken into account the growing trade deficit as well as

ongoing job loss in various U.S. manufacturing sectors, and the Senate has drafted a bill
that would allow sanctions against China.
In debate on the issue. Senator Lindsey Graham said,
“No longer will the United States sit on the sidelines and allow other nations to
gain an unfair advantage by manipulating their currency. Our legislation is a
much-needed and long overdue change. There is no doubt that China and other
nations have been manipulating their currency to give themselves an advantage.
For too long the game has been rigged against American business. Working
together we will change currency practices to put American business on a level
,,64
playing field.
Previously, the U.S. Treasury had the right to make claims to the WTO under
antidumping and countervailing duty laws in the event that a country was found to be
manipulating its exchange rate as a form of export subsidy. Various coalitions and
manufacturers have made repeated claims that China is guilty of currency manipulation.

61

James A. Morrissey. “US/China Textile Trade Deficit Hits New High.” 19 February
2008. Textile World. 30 March. 2008. <

http://www.textileworld.eom/Articles/2008/February_2008/Textile_World_News/Textile
_Trade_Deficit_Hits_New_High.html>
62
Morrissey
63
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. “Background Note: China.” October 2007.
U.S. Department of State. 18 Mar. 2008. <http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ei/bgn/18902.htm>
64
Committee on Finance. “Senators’ Bill Puts New Tools, Teeth in Currency Policy.” 13
June 2007. United States Senate. 18 March 2008. <http://fmance.senate.gov>
46

but so far the IJ.S. Commerce Department has refused to validate exchange rate
differentials as a basis for assessing countervailing duties.^^ Furthermore, the U.S.
Treasury Department has not officially labeled China as a “currency manipulator.
Failure of these branches of the U.S. government to take action against China as a
currency manipulator has spawned members of Congress to draft a bill that would apply
more pressure on China to change its exchange rate.
The bill, which was proposed on July 26, 2007, would repeal the current law that
requires the U.S. freasury Department to identify countries that manipulate their
currency. Fhe new law would instead require the Treasury to identify countries with
.^7

“fundamentally misaligned currencies.

According to the Congressional Research

Service, the Treasury Secretary would be instructed to “(1) analyze semiannually the
prevailing real effective exchange rates of foreign currencies;(2)determine whether any
such currency is in fundamental misalignment; and (3)designate it for priority action if
»»68

the issuing country engages in specified behaviour.

In effect, the bill, if passed, would

force the U.S. government to label China’s currency as “misaligned” and take action
against it.
Actions of a foreign government that merit “priority action” by the U.S. include
large-scale, one-way intervention in the currency exchange market; prolonged
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accumulation of foreign assets for balance of payment purposes; and use of currency
69

controls inconsistent with the goal of achieving full currency convertibility,

As of now,

members of Congress and manufacturing coalitions alike are in agreement that China is
guilty of these actions. This is because, until 2005, China allowed its currency to remain
pegged to the U.S. dollar despite significant growth in GDP. It has since revalued its
currency by 2.1% against the US dollar and moved to an exchange rate system that
70

references a basket of currencies.

Still, its currency value appears artificially low to

many experts. Furthermore, China's current-account surplus is extraordinarily high,
71

reaching nearly U.S. $250 billion in 2006.
According to the bill, if a country’s currency is found to be “fundamentally
misaligned," the U.S. Treasury will seek help from the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) in pressuring the country to eliminate the currency misalignment. If the country
does not do so within 90 days, the Commerce Department retains the right to impose
higher duties in anti-dumping investigations to offset the currency misalignment. Ifthe
country has failed to correct the misalignment after 360 days, the U.S. would be required
to initiate dispute settlement proceedings at WTO meetings. Some legislators are calling
for tariff increases on imported goods equal to the amount of the currency misalignment.
I'o the dismay of U.S, textile manufacturers, the bill, which has been slightly
modified and relabeled the Hunter-Ryan Currency Reform and Fair Trade Act of 2007,
has not yet been passed. There are a number of reasons for this. First, it is impossible to
evaluate the degree of undervaluation of currencies against the dollar. Second, the bill
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fails to lake into account the natural effect of the market, savings rates, and U.S.
government deficit on the foreign country's exchange rate. Third, some legislators worry
that a mandator) currcnc) re\ aluation would disrupt trade relations between the U.S. and
China, one ol' its most important trading partners. Fourth, and most importantly, a drastic
revaluation of currency in a short period of time would be devastating, not only to the
businesses and banks in the culprit country, but also to the global economy as a whole.
China is one of the world's largest trading partners, and U.S. policy makers are claiming
that its currency is undervalued by as much as 40 percent. An appreciation in the
Chinese Yuan of even half of this number would cause extreme upset in the market and a
tremendous rise in prices of imports. Of course, this is exactly what domestic producers
desire, but the effects of such a price increase must be considered from a consumer
standpoint as well.
Auggie Tantillo, executive director of the American Manufacturing Trade Action
Coalition, states that the failure of the Hunter-Ryan Currency Reform and Fair Trade Act
72

to pass was “deeply disappointing” to U.S. manufacturers,

He argues that in light of

rampant job loss and a recessing economy that relief in the form of anti-currency
m73

manipulation is needed “now more than ever,

He and other textile manufacturers

intend to keep up the fight against Chinese textile imports in any way that they can.
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L.

Conclusion

In light of the recent failure of the Hunler-Ryan Currency Reform Act to pass,
U.S. textile manul'acturers appear unlikely to win the fight against Chinese imports. As
evidenced by the multiple bilateral negotiations limiting textile imports from China and
other developing countries. U.S. textile workers once made up a powerful industry with
heavy political sway. In recent years, however, China has become too strong a player to
hold back. No longer of inlluence, the American Knitwear Association(AKA),
American Apparel Manufacturers Association(AAMA), American Sweater Association
(AASA), and even the American Textile Manufacturers Institute(ATMI), all of which
used to be powerful lobbying coalitions, have disintegrated. Europe, too, has proven
unable to resist China's might, as seen in Germany’s huge decrease in world textile
market share in 2005. Policy makers seem far less willing to help domestic producers
today; it has become clear that China is now a dominant global trading partner, and stable
political relations with the country now take precedence over domestic manufacturing
coalitions.
Even still, the currency issue may not be over. Textile and other manufacturers in
the U.S. feel strongly that China's undervalued exchange rate gives the country an unfair
advantage, and, as previously noted, are pushing hard for legislation against it. But a
forced revaluation would likely cause severe market disruption and unnecessary political
disputes. Perhaps the U.S. or even another country will find a milder way to approach
the issue than did the drafters of the Hunter-Ryan Act. Or perhaps China will take the
initiative to revalue its currency on its own accord. Whatever happens,just as quota
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restrictions failed in the past, changing China's currency exchange rate will probably be
unsuccessful in lowering its high volume of exports.
Textile manufacturers in the developed world may find still another way to attack
Chinese imports, such as through human rights or labor standards issues. But China has
already proven to the world that it cannot be restrained by international policy. As it used
the MPA to its ad\ anlagc h\ di\ ersilying and improving its textile products, it will likely
find innovative ways to evade future legislation. It currently leads the world in textile
and apparel exports, and developed countries are in no position to take its place.
Still, just as Great Britain and the U.S. eventually their saw glory days of textile
production expire, China will likely one day move up the production chain into highervalue goods. Its more-de\'eloped East Asian neighbors, such as Japan and South Korea,
have already progressed down the path into advanced technology sectors. If history
repeats itself, China, too, will inevitably move the focus of its industry away from textiles
and into more capital-intensive goods. When this happens, it will be due to natural
economic forces, and another textile giant will be waiting to take its place.
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